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ABSTRACT 
Microfinance institutions of Asia work exclusively with the mission of social welfare hence play 
an important role in the economic and financial development of a region.Endogeneity poses a 
serious threat to the authenticity of corporate governance and performance studies because of the 
endogenous nature of many governance and performance variables. Thispaper addresses this 
issue in the context of microfinance sector in Asia by answering the question whether social 
performance determines the corporate governance mechanism of MFIs. Using a panel of 173 
MFIs in 18 Asian countries for the period of five years, a comprehensive corporate governance 
index (CGI)based on of seven internal governance mechanism variables in constructed as an 
indicator of the overall corporate governance mechanism of MFIs. By employing GLS model, 
our results indicate insignificant impact of corporate governance on many social performance 
variables which are attributed to the endogenous nature of this relationship as the significance of 
results improved by studying relationship in reverse direction by employing ordered logit model. 
Our results indicate that social performance is an important determinant of corporate governance 
mechanism of MFIs even after controlling for MFI related characteristics.  
Keywords: Microfinance, Corporate Governance, Social performance,Endogeneity, Asia 
JEL Classifications: G21; G30; M14 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many studies in literature provide the evidence of the link between corporate governance 
practices and financial performance of firms suggesting either good governance leads to 
improved financial performance in firms (Morck et al. 1988; Wruck, 1989; Welbourne, 1999; 
Randoy and Goel, 2001; Mitton, 2002; Fernandez and Gomez, 2002; Oxelheim et al. 2003; Chen 
et al. 2007) or corporate governance itself is affected by prior firm performance (Kole, 1996; 
Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; Bohren and Odegaard, 2001; Farooque et al. 2007a; 
2007b). These studies have basis in Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory which states 
that well defined corporate governance system is an effective tool in reducing conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders of firms. Stakeholder theory takes us one step ahead by 
advocating that firms should be managed in the interest of all stakeholders like customers, 
employees, society etc. instead of only shareholders. Hence it can be said that corporate social 
responsibility is a missing link between corporate governance and performance which can be 
used strategically to resolve conflicts between managers and shareholders of firm (Freeman, 
1984). Jensen, 2002; Scherer et al. 2006; Harjoto and Jo 2011; Jo and Harjoto, 2011; 2012 found 
evidence of conflict-resolution hypothesis using social responsibility as a missing link between 
corporate governance and firm performance. 
Recently microfinance sector, which was developed in response to the prevailing poverty 
conditions in Asia (Daherand Sout, 2013), is experiencing “mission drift” from its primary social 
goals to profit maximization (Vanroose, 2007; Cull et al. 2007; Gonzalez et al. 2008; Hermes et 
al. 2009; Sinha et al. 2011; Schmied; 2014). Mersland and Strom (2008); (2009); Coleman and 
Osei (2008); Manderlier et al. (2009); Bassem (2009); Tchuigoua (2010); Aboagye and Otieku 
(2010); Hartarska and mersland (2012) and Galema et al. (2012) found evidence of how 
corporate governance practices in microfinance institutions can help them in fulfilling their 
social responsibility. However, this is only the one dimension of corporate governance and social 
responsibility relationship that has been addressed in microfinance literature. Ackerman (1973) 
pointed out that firms social orientation is not only derived by the managers good intentions but 
should be a constant part of firms business practices. Graaf and Herkstroter (2007) asserted that 
corporate social responsibility of a firm is entrenched into its governance structure which makes 
it possible to incorporate stakeholder’s interest in business processes. Jamali et al. (2008) 
suggested that corporate governance and social performance are overlapping concepts with 
corporate governance as a pillar of corporate social responsibility or corporate social 
responsibility as a dimension of corporate governance. In fact more and more firms are 
integrating corporate social responsibility concepts in their business practices by using special 
corporate responsibility committees in their governance structures (Spitzeck, 2009). Labie and 
Mersland (2011) suggested incorporating stakeholders approach in corporate governance 
literature of microfinance to broaden its vision and suggested that it would help identify how 
MFIs are really managed in relatively un-regulated and market ill-disciplined governance 
structure of microfinance. Mori and Mersland (2014) proved that the board structure and 
performance of MFIs is greatly influenced by the stakeholder’s representation. Microfinance, 
which provides financial services to poorest and under-privileged, is relatively riskier sector of 
economy with the most pressing risks facing this industry are risk of over-indebtedness, credit 
recovery and quality of management and governance (CSFI, 2014). Black et al. (2006) found 
evidence of improved corporate governance in riskier firms and concluded that more risky firms 
needs strict monitoring and control practices hence have overall better governance systems. 
Secondly if stakeholder perspective is true in microfinance and managers use social 
responsibility strategically to reduce agency conflicts then increased social responsibility should 
also bring improved governance structure in MFIs.  Hence, we employee stakeholders approach 
in our paper to examine the corporate governance and social performance relationship by first 
studying how corporate governance can improve social orientation in microfinance sector of 
Asia and later answering the question whether more socially responsible MFIs of Asia are also 
better in their governance structures. 
The paperis organized as follows.Section II discusses the relevant literature followed by research 
methodology presented in section III. The descriptive and empirical analysis is presented in 
section IV followed by conclusion and recommendations at the end in section V. 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Different researchers have studied the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance in different sectors and have found problems of endogeneity. Dalton et al. (1999) 
performed Meta-analysis and found positive relationship between board size and firm 
performance. Meta-analysis cannot determine the direction of causality so it was not clear 
whether board size increases performance or vice versa so they concluded that future research 
was needed for assessing the direction of causality. Borsch and Koke (2002) surveyed different 
papers on corporate governance and found certain econometric problems in those empirical 
studies. Most common problem which they noticed was that certain variables were assumed to 
be exogenous but were actually endogenous. They claimed that reverse causality is present in the 
relationship of corporate governance and firm performance. Cho (1998) studied the relationship 
of ownership structure, investment and corporate value in 326 manufacturing firms of Fortune 
500. Evidence of endogeneity was found in the results and it was concluded that investment 
affects value of firm which further affects ownership structure while ownership structure had no 
effect on corporate value. Gruszczynski (2006) studied corporate governance ratings as 
endogenous variable and concluded that companies having high profits and low debt ratio will 
probably have good corporate governance ratings.  
Zhao et al. (2009) studied the determinants of board size and composition. Firm size, growth 
opportunities, geographical distribution and M&A activity were considered important 
determinants of board size and composition. Farooque et al. (2007 and 2012) also studied 
corporate governance endogenously and found evidence of reverse causality between 
performance and corporate governance in listed firms of Dhaka stock exchange for period of 8 
years. Valenti et al. (2011) studied the impact of firm performance changes on board 
composition and found decreased board size and outsiders after decreased performance.  
The evidence of leadership structure as an endogenous issue was also provided by Chen et al. 
(2008). They found that firms which changed their leadership structure were experiencing 
declining performance and their performance did not improve after changing leadership 
structure. 
Elsayed (2007) found no impact of leadership structure on corporate performance in Egyptian 
public limited firms. Whole sample was divided into three sub-groups on the basis of 
performance and significant positive relationship was found between both variables in low 
performance sub-group. Hillman et al. (2007) studied presence of female directors in board as an 
endogenous variable in a sample of 1000 US firms and found female board member likelihood to 
be greatly determined by the organizational size, nature of industry and formal network of the 
organization. Adams and Ferreira (2009) found the negative impact of gender diversity on 
financial outcomes of US firms. They attributed these negative results more robust than the 
previous studies claiming positive relationship between two variables as they addressed the issue 
of endogeneity in performance and gender diversity relationship. In the end they highlighted the 
importance of studying endogeneity of gender diversity in performance regressions. Wintoki et 
al. (2009) also highlighted the issue of endogeneity in governance and performance relationship 
and claimed that the past research on performance-governance relationship claiming positive or 
negative relationship between the two variables is biased and accredited this biasness with the 
unaddressed problem of endogeneity in previous literature.  
In the context of microfinance, limited literature is present on the issue of endogeneity in 
governance and performance relationship. However, there are few studies that have studied this 
relationship endogenously  
Hudon (2006) studied the relationship between MFI management and performance by using an 
un-weighted mean of four management indicators namely as a response variable. Results 
suggested that MFIs having greater outstanding loans are better managed. Mori and Mersland 
(2014) found significant impact of stakeholders on boards on the overall structure of boards and 
organizational performance. Both funders i.e. donors and creditors were associated with small 
sized boards while presence of employees on boards was associated with larger board size. 
Results also suggested the presence of one-tier board structure in MFIs having customers or 
creditors as board members. Strom et al. (2014) answered the question whether female 
leadership in MFIs improves their governance and financial performance and found the presence 
of weaker governance mechanism and improved performance in MFIs having female leadership. 
Previous researches claim the results of governance-performance relationship to be biased 
because of the endogenous nature of both variables. As the major source of endogeneity is 
reverse causality so the relationship of corporate governance and performance runs in both 
directions. Thus, as the social performance of firms is determined by the corporate governance 
practices, in the same way corporate governance mechanism of firms must also be determined by 
their social performance. Therefore, this study focuses on the issue of endogeneity and studies 
the impact of social performance of MFIs on their corporate governance mechanism. 
The Construction of Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 
Prior studies provide evidence of the link between corporate governance practices and 
performance in microfinance (Mersland and Strom, 2008; 2009; Hartarska and mersland, 2012; 
Tchuigoua, 2010; Aboagye and Otieku, 2010; Thrikawala et al. 2013; Galema et al. 2012; 
Bassem, 2009; Polanco, 2005; Hartarska and Nadolnyal, 2007; Coleman and Osei, 2008; 
Manderlier et al. 2009; Boehe and Cruz, 2013; Mori and Mersland, 2014; Strom et al. 2014). 
However, all these studies provide separate investigation of different characteristic of corporate 
governance and ignore their combined effect which is considered more effective approach 
(Gompers et al. 2003; Bebchuk et al. 2008). Chen et al. (2007) highlighted the importance of 
combined measure of all corporate governance variables by pointing out that certain 
characteristic of corporate governance may complement other characteristic or may actually be a 
proxy for some other characteristic. Based on the above literature, we construct an index of 
seven corporate governance variables, related to leadership and ownership dimensions, from the 
perspective of microfinance sector of Asia. 
Board Size: Small board size is considered efficient control mechanism because when number 
of director increases beyond seven or eight, their performance decreases (Jensen, 1993). 
According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), when board size increases beyond ten members, it 
becomes difficult for all members to express their opinions. In the perspective of microfinance, 
board size of seven to nine members is considered ideal and five to eleven members is 
considered effective (council of microfinance equity funds, 2012). Hartarska and Mersland 
(2012) found evidence of improved performance in MFIs with board size of up to nine members. 
Therefore, we measure this indicator as value equals 1 if the board size is between seven to nine 
members and 0 otherwise. 
Presence of Female BODs: Female presence in boards is thought to be linked with increased 
MFI performance (Bassem, 2009) as women directors processes managerial skills like public 
relations, human resource and communication skills than operating and marketing skills 
(Thrikawala et al. 2013). Presence of gender diversity on boards also indicates that boards have 
broader perspective (council of microfinance equity funds, 2012).  This argument can also be 
supported by resource dependence theory. Adams and Ferreira (2009) found evidence of 
increased monitoring activities in firms having more gender diversity in their boards. This 
variable is measured as value 1 if MFI has female presence in board, 0 otherwise.  
Board Qualification: According to resource dependence theory, board acts as a resource 
provider for a firm in the form of human capital and relational capital (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Qualified and experienced directors bring skills like banking 
and finance, legal knowledge, community developments, social skills along with the information 
about the target market into the MFIs. Manderlier et al. (2009) considered board to be qualified 
enough if they had enough experience and knowledge in the field of microfinance. Presence of 
qualified directors is linked with increased MFI performance (CGAP Appraisal guide for MFIs, 
2007; 2008; council of microfinance equity funds, 2012). Thus, board qualification is measured 
as value 1 if board has experience and knowledge in microfinance, 0 otherwise. 
Local Directors: Presence of international directors is linked with the improved performance of 
firms in conventional financial institutions (Oxelheim et al. 2003). This may be because 
international directors bring superior business practices in those firms and are better equipped 
with the required skills. However in the context of MFIs, presence of international directors on 
board is linked with the increased costs hence reducing the financial performance (Mersland et 
al. 2009). In MFIs, local directors are better equipped with the information of the local market 
trends which MFI has to serve. Thus, we measure this indicator as value equals 1 if board has 
local directors, 0 otherwise. 
CEO/Chairman Duality: Two-tier board structure is considered more effective than one-tier 
structure in MFIs because when both CEO and board chair positions are separated, it reduces the 
conflict between management and board hence increasing the performance (Coleman and Osei, 
2008). When the roles of CEO and chairman of the board are merged, then the CEOs have more 
power and freedom in decision making which could lead to more risky decisions (Galema et al. 
2012). Thus, CEO duality could mean lack of independent board in an institution which has been 
linked with worse financial and social performance (Hartarska, 2005; Coleman and Osei, 2008). 
We measure CEO/Chairman duality indicator as value 1 if CEO and chairman roles are 
separated, 0 otherwise. 
Female CEO:Boehe and Cruz (2013) found evidence of improved performance in MFIs having 
more female members. Many MFIs in Asia that work with the mission of women empowerment 
mandate could benefit by bringing female membership at all levels of the management including 
its executive level (Campion et al. 2008) as female CEO is better able to gather information from 
females then a male CEO (Mersland and strom, 2009). Even in sectors other than microfinance, 
presence of females in the top management team has been linked with the improved performance 
in the literature (Welbourne, 1999). Therefore, we define this indicator as value 1 if MFIs CEO 
is female, otherwise 0. 
Ownership Type: Many policy advocates in microfinance calls for the transformation of NPOs 
into more profit oriented shareholder firms because they could be better governed by the banking 
authorities (Jansson et al. 2004; Ledgerwood and White, 2006; Campion and White, 2001; Lauer 
2008; Mersland, 2009). There are some benefits of regulation in SHFs on outreach and 
sustainability as regulated MFIs or SHFs offer variety of services in addition to lending and also 
collect savings which is linked with the better scope of outreach of the MFIs (Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak, 2007; Lauer 2008). Servin et al. (2012) proposed SHFs to be more technically 
efficient than the NPOs at both inter-firm and intra-firm level. We measure ownership type 
indicator as value 1 if MFI is a SHF, 0 otherwise. 
CGI is used as a proxy for overall corporate governance mechanism of MFIs. Each variable 
included in CGI is given value equal to 1 for the characteristic that is considered to be effective, 
for the overall performance of MFIs, 0 otherwise. Index is calculated by the sum of all indicators 
values. Maximum index value is 7 indicating effective governance mechanisms while lowest 
index value is 0 indicating weakest governance mechanisms in MFIs. Table 1 shows the brief 
description of the indicators used for the construction of CGI for MFIs.  
Table 1 
 Description of corporate governance indicators 
Indicator  Description  
Board Size  Value equals 1 if the board size is between seven to nine members 
and 0 otherwise. 
Presence of Female 
BODs 
Value equals 1 if female directors are present in board, 0 otherwise. 
Board Qualification Value equals 1 if board has enough experience and knowledge in 
microfinance, 0 otherwise. 
Local Directors Value equals 1 if board has local directors, 0 otherwise. 
CEO/Chairman 
duality 
Value equals 1 if CEO and chairman roles are separated, 0 otherwise. 
Female CEO Value equals 1 if CEO of MFI is female, otherwise 0. 
Ownership type Value equals 1 if MFI is a SHF, 0 otherwise. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample and Data 
Microfinance sector in Asia was originated with the mission to offer financial services to the 
poorest which had been excluded from the conventional financial services. The region is the 
main recipient of microfinance, and given its vast population, also has the largest number of poor 
households in the world. In 2010, about 63 percent of the world’s extreme poor lived in East 
Asia and the Pacific (246 million) as well as in South Asia (507 million)
1
. This population forms 
an immense client base for microfinance, which has not gone unnoticed. Therefore we focuses 
on the microfinance sector of Asia as it can play an important role in financial and economic 
development of a region. 
Our data for this study primarily comes from the MIX market
2
website. Where around 1044 MFIs 
located in 18 countries of Asia i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Georgia, 
India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Sri-
Lanka, Tajikistan and Vietnam, have shared their data. Out of these, 418 MFIs have given a 
rating of 4 diamonds and above by the MIX market based on the transparency and reliability of 
the data shared. Our final sample reduces to a total of 173 MFIs in 18 Asian countries for the 
period of five years from 2007 to 2011 because only MFIs rated by the third party rating 
agencies have been included. Moreover, data for variables used in the construction of CGI index 
has been extracted from the rating reports and the annual reports of respective MFIs. .Those 
rating reports have been accessed from the Rating Fund website
3
. Data for Human Development 
Index (HDI) has been collected from United Nations development Program (UNDP) website
4
 
while data for GDP per capita is taken from the World Bank website
5
. 
3.2. Social Performance 
Social performance of MFIs of Asia is measured on the basis of two dimensions; one dealing 
with final outcome i.e. outreach and second dealing with the internal process of MFIs i.e. female 
employees in an MFI. Females in many rural and conservative areas especially in Asia do not 
                                                             
1
World Bank, “The State of the Poor: Where Are the Poor….. What is the current profile of the World’s poor?” 
(accessed April 2013). 
 
2
MIX (Microfinance Information Exchange) market is a database for microfinance data where all microfinance 
institutions and supporting organizations share their data. MIX market plays an important role in improving 
transparency of this sector. www.mixmarket.org 
3
www.ratingfund2.org  Contains risk assessment reports of 383 MFIs from 73 countries. These MFIs have been 
rated by five microfinance rating agencies; Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil, MicroRate and M-Cril which are 
considered as official rating agencies by CGAP (Consultative group to assist the poor).  
4
www.hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi Data collected on Jan 15
th
 2014 
5www.worldbank.org Data collected on Jan 15th 2014 
feel comfortable in speaking to males. Campion et al. (2008) considered it as a barrier for MFIs 
in achieving their social mission as most of the loan officers in MFIs are male members. So, 
MFIs should consider this operational issue and should hire more female loan officers which 
could target women easily. Female loan officers to Total loan officers is used as a proxy for 
female employees in MFIs 
Outreach of MFIs is measured on the basis of their depth and scope of services and their loan 
size. Depth of outreach measures the extent to which MFI reaches the poorest of the economy 
that have no access to financial sector of the economy (Woller, 2006). Usually women and 
people living in rural areas are considered as poor who have no access to financial services 
offered by the commercial sector. Strom et al. (2014) used gender bias and rurality bias as 
indicators of outreach. Depth of outreach is measured as the ratio of women borrowers to total 
borrowers and borrowers located in the rural areas as compared to total borrowers (Rauf and 
Mahmood, 2009; Mersland and Strom, 2008). 
Diversity of products offered by an MFI is termed as its scope of outreach (Woller, 2006; 
Schreiner, 2002). Schreiner (2002) defined scope between products as offering lending and 
savings services both. MFI offering saving services to its clients have better outreach than MFI 
offering only lending services. Ratio of women savers to total savers is used to measure the 
scope of outreach (Rauf and Mahmood, 2009). Type of savings offered by the MFI also 
determines its scope of outreach. Voluntary saving services are preferred over compulsory 
saving services by the MFI and shows better outreach (Woller, 2006). Ratio of voluntary deposit 
accounts to total deposit accounts is also used as an indicator of scope of outreach. 
Loan size is another measure of outreach as it can be used as a proxy for assessing the reach of 
MFIs to the poor. This can be done by taking into account the average outstanding loan (AOL). 
Average outstanding loan and ratio of AOL to per capita GNI were used as indicators of loan 
size by Polanco, (2005); Christen, (2001) and Christen et al. (1995). This study measures loan 
size as ratio of AOL to per capita GNI. 
3.3. Control Variables 
Literature provides evidence that larger the age of a firm, better will be its corporate governance 
practices (Black et al. 2006). This may be because older firms have more experience and have 
had more time to improve their internal governance. Black et al. (2006) measured age of a firm 
as Ln (years). Mori and Mersland (2014) and Strom et al. (2014) measured age of an MFI as 
number of years of operation of MFI. Crombrugghe et al. (2008) used log of years as a proxy for 
age of MFIs. This study measures age as log of years since establishment of MFIs.  
According to Black et al. (2006) size of a firm is a variable other than performance that could 
affect the corporate governance choices. They measured firm size as Ln (assets). Mori and 
Mersland (2014) measured size of MFIs as logarithm of assets. Strom et al. (2014) used total 
assets as a proxy for size of MFI. This study uses log of total assets of an MFI as a proxy for size 
of institution.  
Risk of a firm is also an important determinant of the effectiveness of governance system in 
firms (Black et al. 2006). Mersland and Strom (2009); Hartarska and Mersland (2012) and 
Mersland et al. (2008) used portfolio risk as an indicator of overall risk of MFI measured as 
portfolio at risk 30 days (PAR 30). This study measures risk of MFI as PAR 30. PAR 30 is 
defined as the value of all outstanding loans considered at risk because payments are 30 days 
past due.  
Black et al. (2006) considered regulatory status as the most important indicator affecting 
governance in firms. Hartarska (2005) included ‘supervised’ as an external control variable in 
governance performance relationship and measured it as a dummy with value 1 if MFI was 
supervised by banking authority, 0 otherwise. In this study regulatory status is measured as a 
dummy having value 1 if MFI is regulated by a banking authority, 0 otherwise. 
MFIs offer many types of lending services to its customers like group lending, individual lending 
etc. Cull et al. (2007) defined three types of MFIs on the basis of their lending methodology; 
individual lenders, group lenders and village banks. Mersland and Strom (2009) considered loan 
methodology as an important dimension in MFIs governance performance studies. They 
measured lending methodology as a dummy with value 1 if MFI offered mainly individual 
lending services. This study uses three dummies for lending methodology variable; first MFIs 
offering individual lending services, second MFIs offering group lending services and third MFIs 
offering both types of lending services.  
According to legal structure MFIs can be classified into five types; banks, rural banks, NBFIs, 
NGOs and credit unions or cooperatives (CGAP Appraisal guide for MFIs, 2007 and 2008). 
Governance practices differ in MFIs according to their legal status (council of microfinance 
equity funds, 2012). For example legal status of an MFI determines the ownership structure of 
MFIs and who has the decision making power in them (Lapenu and Pierret, 2006). So, there is a 
need to control for the type of MFIs according to their legal status. This study measures legal 
status as five dummy variables of banks, rural banks, NBFIs, NGOs and credit unions.  
Human development index (HDI) and GDP per capita are used as country controls as this study 
revolves around the MFIs of Asia and there is a need to control for country specific effects. 
Human development index is a UNDP indicator covering standard of living, knowledge and life 
expectancy. GDP per capita is a world development indicator calculated as total output of 
economy divided by number of people in an economy. Mersland and Strom (2009) used HDI to 
control country specific effects in their study of corporate governance and performance. Strom et 
al. (2014) used HDI and GDP per capita to control for country specific changes. 
 
Following hypotheses are proposed to study the impact of social performance on overall 
corporate governance mechanism of MFIs: 
H1: Social performance has significant impact on corporate governance mechanism of 
MFIs. 
CGIi* = Xi’β + Yi’γ +εi 
Where, 
Xi’β = β1WTB + β2RTB + β3WTD + β4VTD + β5AOL per capita GNI + β6FTL 
Yi’γ = γ1Log assets + γ2Log age + γ3PAR 30 + γ4GDP/capita + γ5HDI + γ6RS1 + γ7LM1 + 
γ8LM2 + γ9LS1 + γ10LS2 + γ11LS3 + γ12LS4                                         (1)                                     
H1a: Depth of outreach has significant impact on corporate governance mechanism of MFIs. 
CGIi* = Xi’β + Yi’γ +εi 
Where, 
Xi’β = β1WTB + β2RTB  
Yi’γ = γ1Log assets + γ2Log age + γ3PAR 30 + γ4GDP/capita + γ5HDI + γ6RS1 + γ7LM1 + 
γ8LM2 + γ9LS1 + γ10LS2 + γ11LS3 + γ12LS4                                         (2)                                                                
H1b: Scope of outreach has significant impact on corporate governance mechanism of MFIs. 
CGIi* = Xi’β + Yi’γ +εi 
Where, 
Xi’β = β1WTD + β2VTD 
Yi’γ = γ1Log assets + γ2Log age + γ3PAR 30 + γ4GDP/capita + γ5HDI + γ6RS1 + γ7LM1 + 
γ8LM2 + γ9LS1 + γ10LS2 + γ11LS3 + γ12LS4                                         (3) 
H1c: Loan size has significant impact on corporate governance mechanism of MFIs. 
CGIi* = Xi’β + Yi’γ +εi 
Where, 
Xi’β = β1AOL/GNI 
Yi’γ = γ1Log assets + γ2Log age + γ3PAR 30 + γ4GDP/capita + γ5HDI + γ6RS1 + γ7LM1 + 
γ8LM2 + γ9LS1 + γ10LS2 + γ11LS3 + γ12LS4                                         (4) 
 
H1d: Presence of female loan officers has significant impact on corporate governance 
mechanism of MFIs. 
CGIi* = Xi’β + Yi’γ +εi 
Where, 
Xi’β = β1FTL 
Yi’γ = γ1Log assets + γ2Log age + γ3PAR 30 + γ4GDP/capita + γ5HDI + γ6RS1 + γ7LM1 + 
γ8LM2 + γ9LS1 + γ10LS2 + γ11LS3 + γ12LS4                                         (5) 
 
Where  
CGI=Corporate governance index, PAR 30=portfolio at risk 30 days, HDI= human development 
index, RS1=Regulated MFIs, LM1= Individual lending, LM2=Group lending, LS1=Banks, LS2 
=Rural banks, LS3=NBFIs andLS4=NGO. 
 
4. ANALYSIS 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
CG Index is a main dependent variable of the study and is composed of 7 corporate governance 
indicators namely board size, female directors, international directors, board qualification, 
female CEO, CEO/chairman duality and ownership type. CGI is an ordinal variable whose 
values could range from 0 to 7. The description of CGI is shown in table II.  
Table II 
Description of corporate governance index 
CGI Frequency Percent Cum. 
1 5 0.58 0.58 
2 40 4.62 5.2 
3 140 16.18 21.39 
4 270 31.21 52.6 
5 265 30.64 83.24 
6 125 14.45 97.69 
7 20 2.31 100 
Total 865 100  
The descriptive analysis of all predictors and control variables involved in this study is shown in 
table III. Descriptive statistics shows that the average age of the microfinance sector is only 12 
years which proves that the microfinance sector of Asia is still very young and is in its early 
stages. However one MFI in our sample is as old as 39 years. Minimum value of 0 indicates that 
MFIs established in year 2007 have also been included in our sample. This study uses log of 
years since establishment as predictor of the age of MFI. The average size of the microfinance 
sector of Asia is 90911 dollars as measured by the mean of total assets.  
The values of average women to total borrowers and women to total depositors are 0.72 and 
0.323 respectively which shows that 72% borrowers and 32.3% depositors of all selected MFIs 
are women. Minimum value of 0 indicates that some MFIs in our sample have no female 
borrowers or depositors while maximum value of 1 indicates that some MFIs in Asia target only 
female clients. Average rural to total borrowers of 0.594 indicates that 59.4% clients of the MFIs 
included in sample belong to rural areas. Some MFIs in our sample do not target rural clients as 
can be seen from the minimum value of 0 while some MFIs are the specialized rural banks that 
only target population living in rural areas as can be seen from maximum value of 1. The mean 
of voluntary to total deposit a/c is 0.248 which means that 24.8% of all deposit accounts in 
selected MFIs of Asia are voluntary. Some MFIs only offer compulsory saving services as can be 
seen by the minimum value of 0 while some MFIs offer only voluntary savings services as can 
be seen by maximum value of 1. The means of female to total loan officers is 0.19. This shows 
that on average female loan officers in our sample are only 19% of total loan officers. Minimum 
value of 0 indicates that some MFIs do not hire any female employees while in some MFIs all 
loan officers are female. Standard deviation for female to total loan officers is 0.26. AOL/per 
capita GNI have a mean value of 0.29 with the minimum value of .023 and maximum value of 
1.02. Lower AOL/per capita GNI indicate small loan size and better outreach. Standard deviation 
of AOL/per capita GNI is 0.24. 
Table III 
Descriptive statistics summary of the variables 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 Measurement  N Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Dev 
Women to total 
borrowers 
(WTB) 
Number of women 
borrowers / 
Number of total 
borrowers 
865 .0000 1.0000 .7218 .8490 .3001 
Rural to total 
borrowers (RTB) 
Number of rural 
borrowers / 
Number of total 
borrowers 
865 .0000 1.0000 .5942 .6500 .3409 
Women to total 
depositors 
(WTD) 
Number of women 
depositors/ 
Number of total 
depositors 
865 .0000 1.0000 .3239 .0000 .4276 
Voluntary to 
total deposit 
accounts (VTD) 
Number of 
voluntary deposit 
accounts/ Number 
of total deposit 
accounts 
865 .0000 1.0000 .2482 .0000 .3983 
AOL/per capita 
GNI 
Average 
outstanding loans 
(AOL) / Per capita 
GNI 
865 .0235 1.0287 .2932 .2030 .2455 
Female to total 
loan officers 
(FTL) 
Female loan 
officers / Total 
loan officers 
865 .0000 1.0000 .1927 .0733 .2618 
Age (years) Number of years 
since establishment  
865 .0000 39 11.9710 11 7.1349 
Log age Log of years since 
establishment 
865 .0000 1.59 .9882 1.0414 .3083 
Total assets in 
1000s ($) 
Total assets in 
1000s 
865 .0000 51223 90911 15043 3.4580 
Log assets Log of total assets 
of MFI 
865 .0000 9.7095 7.1948 7.177335 .7990 
Portfolio at risk 
(PAR) 
Value of loans 
outstanding whose 
payments are past 
30 days due 
865 .0000 7.1143 .0682 .015700 .2967 
Human Index of human 865 .4400 .7840 .6001 .551000 .0944 
development 
index (HDI) 
living standard, life 
expectancy and 
education 
GDP/Capita Total output of an 
economy / number 
of people in an 
economy 
865 1687 22502 5943.7134 4399.8515 4720.6755 
Valid N   865      
 
75% MFIs of our sample are regulated by some regulatory or banking authority while remaining 
25% are non-regulated.12% of our sample is composed of regular banks, 6% rural banks, 47% 
non-banking financial institutions, 31% NGOs and 4% is composed of credit unions. 21% MFIs 
of Asia included in our sample offer individual lending, 23% group lending and remaining 56% 
offer both kinds of lending services. 
 
 
Figure 1:Corporate governance according to the regulatory status 
Source: Based on authors self-calculations 
Figure 1 depicts the overall corporate governance mechanism of MFIs of Asia according to their 
regulatory status. Regulated MFIs have a better system of overall corporate governance as 
compared to the non-regulated MFIs. The value of median is same for both regulated and non-
regulated MFIs i.e. 4 however the greater variation in the non-regulated MFIs depicts the overall 
better corporate governance in regulated MFIs. Variance in corporate governance index for 
regulated MFIs is 1.29 compared to the variance of 1.47 for non-regulated MFIs. Minimum 
value of corporate governance index for regulated MFIs is 3 compared to the minimum value of 
2 for non-regulated MFIs, showing that all regulated MFIs have overall corporate governance 
index score of at least 3. 
 
Figure 2:Corporate governance according to the legal status 
Source: Based on authors self-calculations 
Figure 2 depicts the overall corporate governance mechanism in MFIs of Asia according to their 
legal status. Corporate governance index is used as a proxy for overall corporate governance 
system and the highest corporate governance index score of 5 for both regular banks and rural 
banks indicate that both have almost same level of corporate governance system. However the 
value of variance in CG Index for regular banks is 0.920 and for rural banks is 1.469. The value 
of variance in CG Index for regular banks is low compared to that of rural banks which shows 
that regular banks are the highest performing MFIs in terms of corporate governance system. The 
lowest performing MFIs are the credit unions having the median of 4 with the variance of 1.176. 
 
Figure 3:Corporate governance according to lending methodology 
Source: Based on authors self-calculations 
Figure 3 depicts the overall corporate governance mechanism of MFIs according to the lending 
type offered by them. MFIs that offer both individual and group lending services have the best 
corporate governance system as can be seen by the highest CG Index score of 5. MFIs that offer 
one type of lending service that is either individual or group have CG Index score of 4. However 
the variation in group lending methodology is more as the variance of CG Index for individual 
lending is 0.999 and for group lending is 1.407. MFIs that offer both kinds of services have the 
best system of corporate governance. 
4.2. Empirical analysis 
4.2.1. Correlation 
Table IV provides the correlation matrix of social performance variables, control variables and 
all categorical variables with response variable. There is highly positive and significant 
correlation between WTB and CGI which shows that MFIs that target more female clients and 
work with the mission of women empowerment have to have better governance systems in their 
setup as they target underprivileged members of the society. These MFIs hire more female 
employees as females are better equipped with the women client needs hence significant positive 
correlation is seen between WTB and FTL. RTB and FTL are also highly significantly positively 
correlated with CGI which shows that MFIs that target villages and rural areas and hire more 
female loan officers in those areas have better governance systems. Negative and highly 
significant correlation between AOL per capita GNI and CGI also proves the fact that MFIs 
which are more socially oriented make more efforts for better governance system as negative 
AOL per capita GNI means small sized loans and better outreach. These results are in lined with 
the findings of Strom et al. (2014) who found negative correlation between average loan and 
corporate governance variables even if their correlation was not significant. Results also shows 
positive correlation between WTD and VTD with CGI but this relation is not significant. 
Significant correlation is also present in almost all social performance indicators with each other 
i.e. WTB, RTB, WTD, VTD, AOL per capita GNI and FTL which shows the fact that all of these 
indicators are different dimensions of one variable i.e. social performance. There is positive and 
significant correlation of log year with social performance indicators. This shows that MFIs 
which are more mature and have more experience have more chances of working with the social 
objectives. Table IV is attached in appendix. 
4.2.2. Regression 
In order to analyze the endogeneity in corporate governance and performance relationship in 
MFIs of Asia, regression analysis is carried out in two parts; the first part focuses on the impact 
of corporate governance mechanism of MFIs on their social and financial performance while the 
second part analyzes the reverse-causality in governance and performance relationship by 
studying the relationship in reverse direction i.e. the impact of social and financial performance 
on corporate governance mechanism of MFIs. 
4.2.2.1.Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanism on social Performance 
Generalized Least Square (GLS) models for panel data are used for analyzing the impact of 
corporate governance mechanism on MFIs social performance. Table V shows the GLS model 
results for the impact of CGI on social performance. Table V is attached in appendix A. 
By employing random effects model, it is seen that CGI has insignificant impact on outreach 
indicators of RTB, WTD and VTD. The insignificant impact of corporate governance 
mechanism on outreach of MFIs shows that good governance practices in MFIs do not 
necessarily mean the social orientation of those MFIs. Outreach of MFIs does not improve with 
better governance practices. However, WTB and loan size are significantly determined by the 
corporate governance of MFIs at 10% significance level. The significant results of FTL also 
show that MFIs having good governance practices hire more female loan officers. 
The insignificant results many social performance variables with the corporate governance 
mechanism of MFIs could be attributed to the endogenous nature of governance and social 
performance relationship. As reverse-causality may exist in this relationship so, the social 
performance of MFIs may determine the governance practices in those MFIs. In this regard, next 
section studies the impact of MFIs social performance on their corporate governance mechanism. 
4.2.2.2.Impact of Performance on Corporate Governance Mechanism 
Corporate governance index (CGI) constructed in this study is an ordinal variable with values 
from 0 to 7 in ascending order. The models for ordered response variable are the most suitable 
option for this kind of response variable (Wooldridge, 2010). The ordinal variable CGI is related 
to the continuous latent variable CGI* which measures corporate governance mechanism of 
MFIs. The linear model for CGI* is equal to 
CGIi* = Xi’β + εi 
Where, β = k x 1 and Xi’ does not contain a constant. 
The value of CGI* is unknown unless it crosses certain threshold points (α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, α6). 
Where, 
CGI = 1 if α-∞ < CGI* ≤ α1 
CGI = 2 if α1 < CGI* ≤ α2 
CGI = 3 if α2 < CGI* ≤ α3 
CGI = 4 if α3 < CGI* ≤ α4 
CGI = 5 if α5 < CGI* ≤ α6 
CGI = 6 if α6 < CGI* ≤ α∞ 
Gruszczynski (2006) used ordered logit model for estimating relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance for ordered response variable; firm CGI ratings. This study 
also estimates ordered logit model for the ordinal variable CGI for explaining the relationship 
between corporate governance and social performance in MFIs of Asia.  
H1: Social performance has a significant impact on corporate governance mechanism of 
MFIs. 
Table VI provides ordinal logit regression results for social performance and CGI. Model 1 
measures the aggregate impact of all social performance indicators on CGI in the presence of 
control variables. Models 2 to 5 measure the individual effect of each social performance 
indicator on CGI by controlling the effect of control variables. The values of chi-square shows 
that models depicted in table VI are significant at 1% level of significance which indicates that 
models valid.  
Variable WTB has a positive and significant relationship with CGI at 10% level of significance 
in model 1. This shows that MFIs which are more socially oriented and work with the mission of 
women empowerment are more likely to have better governance mechanism in their setups. We 
attribute this finding of our research to the fact that the governance structure of institution is 
greatly determined by its strategic vision (Lapenu and Pierret, 2006) and as most of the MFIs of 
Asia work with the mission of women empowerment female leadership is preferred over male 
leadership because of the communication problems faced by female members of Asian society. 
Female leadership reduces information asymmetry problems hence enhances overall governance 
system in MFIs (Mersland and Strom, 2009). 
RTB also has a positive relationship with CGI and this relationship is highly significant at 1% 
significance level which shows that MFIs targeting specifically rural population are more likely 
to have better governance systems. This could be because MFIs that target poor people living in 
local rural areas are more prone to credit and default risks, hence these MFIs need better 
monitoring and control practices in their operations to minimize those risks and to tap into local 
market networks (Mersland and Strom, 2009). MFIs having more local operations targeting local 
areas are also able to monitor and control those operations more effectively on day to day basis 
because of better access to local markets and reduced costs like travelling expenditure etc. 
(Lapenu and Pierret, 2006). These results are also in lined with the results of Black et al. (2006) 
who found that riskier firms need more strict monitoring systems hence they have better 
governance present in them and the MFIs serving poorest are more prone to default and credit 
risks. Model 1.1 measures the individual effect of depth of outreach on CGI in the presence of 
control variables.  Results of WTB have improved a lot from 10% significance level to 1% 
significance level in model 2 as WTB was highly correlated with all other social performance 
indicators as was seen in correlation table IV. 
Table VI 
Ordered logit regression results for models 1 to 5 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 
Corporate 
Governance 
Index (CGI) 
     
WTB .6013288* 
(1.91) 
1.166465*** 
(4.05) 
   
RTB .5690231*** 
(2.96) 
.5479653*** 
(2.89) 
   
WTD .3034306 
(1.60) 
 .2648953 
(1.43) 
  
VTD .0766102 
(0.42)  
 -.0107834 
(-0.06) 
  
AOL/GNI -.9761584***   -1.018179***  
(-3.11) (-3.48) 
FTL .9321609*** 
(3.38) 
   1.120289*** 
(4.20) 
HDI 1.498109 
(1.12) 
2.233018* 
(1.70) 
-.0502281 
(-0.04) 
.0766121 
(0.07) 
-.7681502 
(-0.67) 
GDP/capita -.0000122 
(-0.56) 
1.60e-06 
(0.07) 
.0000134 
(0.63) 
-1.47e-06 
(-0.07) 
-6.64e-06 
(-0.31) 
PAR 30 -.1437722 
(-0.75) 
-.0189526 
(-0.10) 
-.0071208 
(-0.04) 
-.0488818 
(-0.26) 
-.1220684 
(-0.64) 
Log age -.1042813 
(-0.39) 
.0725382 
(0.28) 
.0057897 
(0.02) 
.1415379 
(0.55) 
-.0262584 
(-0.10) 
Log assets .0502368 
(0.48) 
.0718315 
(0.72) 
.1065665 
(1.04) 
.0237851 
(0.23) 
  .092465 
(0.92) 
Regulated 
MFIs 
.0490328 
(0.27) 
.1115976 
(0.64) 
.0128378 
(0.07) 
.1676793 
(0.96) 
-.057594 
(-0.33) 
Individual 
lending 
-.6109903*** 
(-3.63) 
-.6666988*** 
(-4.02) 
-.7225913*** 
(-4.37) 
-.6701764*** 
(-4.06) 
-.6739335*** 
(-4.09) 
Group lending -.083115 
(-0.45) 
.0242642 
(0.14) 
.1421273 
(0.78) 
-.0130463 
(-0.07) 
.008446 
(0.05) 
Banks .8162505** 
(2.05) 
.8340473** 
(2.12) 
.6182516 
(1.60) 
.6901623* 
(1.80) 
.4235026 
(1.10) 
Banks (rural) .6129386 
(1.42) 
.6920464 
(1.61) 
.6328953 
(1.49) 
.6687682 
(1.57) 
.4640614 
(1.09) 
NBFIs .3435645 
(0.95) 
.2262596 
(0.65) 
.3501507 
(0.98) 
.2888865 
(0.85) 
.1323338 
(0.39) 
NGOs -.1786913 
(-0.50) 
-.0129322 
(-0.04) 
.0715975 
(0.20) 
-.0541952 
(-0.16) 
-.1979839 
(-0.57) 
Threshold 
points  
     
α1 -3.311316 -1.969053 -4.125662 -4.96892 -5.00189 
α2 -1.06224   .2829951 -1.873384 -2.716911 -2.747117 
α3 .5706656 1.909233 -.2621513 -1.104316 -1.127872 
α4 2.050664 3.366898 1.180197 .3436025 .3229575 
α5 3.661712 4.949852 2.736866 1.911931 1.895194 
α6 5.888524 7.150653 4.905108 4.092039 4.087967 
Log likelihood -1308.408 -1319.2335 -1329.9366 -1324.8965 -1322.0034 
LRChi-square 80.53*** 
(0.0000) 
58.88*** 
(0.0000) 
37.47*** 
(0.0006) 
47.55*** 
(0.0000) 
53.34*** 
(0.0000) 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level, ** Statistical significance at 5% level, * Statistical significance at 10% level 
Omitted variables are non-regulated MFIs, MFIs with individual and group lending, and credit unions 
The results of WTD and VTD show positive and insignificant relationship of scope of outreach 
and corporate governance system in MFIs which shows that MFIs offering diversity of products 
may not necessarily have better governance system than those offering few products and 
services. These results are also consistent when the effect of WTD and VTD is seen individually 
on CGI in model 3 by controlling the effect of control variables. We attribute these contrasting 
results for the significance of depth and scope of outreach to the small average age of 
microfinance sector of Asia i.e. 12 years as can be seen in table III. As most of the MFIs are 
young entrepreneurial firms, optimal level of governance has not settled in this sector (Strom et 
al, 2014). 
The results of AOL per capita GNI are negative and highly significant at 1% significance level 
which shows that the MFIs that offer small sized loans are more likely to have better governance 
mechanism. As smaller sized loans are linked with better outreach to poor (Crombrugghe et al. 
2008), so the MFIs working with social objectives are more likely to have better governance. 
This maybe because smaller sized loans are offered to mostly poor in the group liability format 
of lending methodology which is used by MFIs as a cure for increased repayment and credit risk 
in this sector as smaller loans offered in groups are easier to monitor and keep track of (Mersland 
and Strom, 2009). Group based lending also brings monitoring and control by group members on 
each other as default of one member can affect whole group (Hermes and Lensink, 2007). The 
results of AOL per capita GNI are same in both models 1 and 4 i.e. negative and statistically 
significant at 1% significance level. These results are in lined with the results of lending 
methodology which again shows that MFIs offering only individual lending services are less 
likely to have good governance system than MFIs offering group or both types of lending 
services. These results are consistent in all models from 1 to 5 with individual lending being 
negative and highly significant at 1% significance level. Another reason for good governance in 
group lending type could be of reduced information asymmetry problems in those MFIs since 
groups are arranged in the manner that people living in closer vicinity are arranged into one 
group. These people are better informed and have social ties with each other (Hermes and 
Lensink, 2007). 
The result of FTL shows positive and significant impact of presence of female employees in 
MFIs on their corporate governance system. These results are also consistent when the impact of 
FTL is checked collectively with other social performance indicators in model 1 and individually 
in model 5. This shows that MFIs having more female loan officers have better governance 
system. We attribute these findings to social mission and gender mandate of microfinance sector 
of Asia as most of the Asian MFIs target women clients and having female loan officers 
enhances their information networks about local markets and reduces information asymmetry 
problems (Campion et al. 2008). 
Results of variable log assets are consistent in all models. Results show positive and insignificant 
impact of MFI size on their CGI. These findings are in lined with the findings of Black et al. 
(2006) even though these results are insignificant. Nevertheless consistent positive sign indicates 
that larger MFIs have more complex structures so they need more defined corporate governance 
mechanism. We attribute the insignificance of the relationship to the fact that microfinance is an 
infant industry still in its development stages. These results could improve with better data set 
covering larger time period. Legal status also shows consistent results across different models 
with banks having significant positive relationship with CGI. These results show that MFIs 
which are banks are more likely to have better governance system and we attribute these results 
to the larger size and complex structure of banking MFIs. As it can be seen in correlation table 
IV, that banks and log assets are positively and significantly correlated with each other indicating 
that banks are the largest of all legal types of MFIs. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Microfinance institutions provide financial services to the underprivileged and poor people and 
serve the market where traditional financial institutions fail to reach which makes the growth of 
this sector an essential factor in the development of the whole economy. Lack of good 
governance practices is considered a main obstacle in the development of microfinance sector in 
different policy guidelines as good governance helps microfinance institutions in protecting their 
social missions. In this regard this study focuses on the concept of corporate governance in 
microfinance and studies the relationship between social performance and corporate governance 
mechanism of microfinance institutions of Asia. Many previous researches claim the results of 
governance performance relationship from literature to be biased because of the issue of 
endogeneity in this relationship. As the major source of endogeneity is reverse causality, this 
study responds to the need of literature in this regard by studying the impact of performance on 
corporate governance, this relationship has never been studied in microfinance domain. 
Using a panel data of 173 MFIs of Asia for a period of five years from 2007 to 2011, regression 
analysis of the study is carried out in two parts; first part studies the impact of corporate 
governance on MFIs social performance while the impact of social performance on overall 
corporate governance mechanism of MFIs is analyzed in the second part of the analysis. The 
results show that social orientation ofMFIs does not improve with good governance practices, 
except smaller loan size and presence of female loan officers. The insignificant results of many 
social performance indicators could be attributed to the endogenous nature of governance and 
performance relationship as the significance of results improved when that relationship was 
studied in reverse direction which confirmed that endogeneity exists and there is a reverse-
causality in corporate governance and performance relationship of MFIs of Asia. 
Revealing results emerge from this study, which have important implications for future 
researches and policy makers. Depth of outreach of MFIs seems to play an important role in 
governance practices of MFIs which shows that MFIs which works with the mission of women 
empowerment and poverty alleviation have good governance practices and this finding is 
supported by the descriptive analysis which shows that rural banks have best governance 
practices compared to other legal types of MFIs. We link these findings to the increased credit 
risk in those clients hence; MFIs need better governance system to enter into risky market 
networks. Smaller loan size and presence of female loan officers also plays very important role 
in enhancing the governance mechanism of MFIs and this could be due to improved information 
networks in those MFIs. 
Given the revealing results of social performance as a determinant of corporate governance 
practices of MFIs, policy makers and regulators should give special treatment to this sector while 
developing policies of corporate governance practices keeping in mind the specific nature of 
microfinance sector of Asia. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table IV 
Correlation matrix of social performance and CGI 
 
 
** Statistical significance at 1% level, * statistical significance at 5% level 
 
APPENDIX B 
Table V: GLS model results for impact of CGI on social performance 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 WTB RTB WTD VTD AOL/GNI FTL 
Constant  1.608129*** 
(8.60) 
.5099243* 
(1.81) 
1.327497*** 
(4.50) 
.512312* 
(1.87) 
.1118652 
(0.64) 
-.655451*** 
(-3.20) 
CGI .0244959* 
(1.80) 
.0242751 
(1.36) 
.0097048 
(0.50) 
.002876 
(0.17) 
-.0243038* 
(-1.86) 
.0311993** 
(2.27) 
HDI -1.753273*** 
(-6.96) 
-.1993387 
(-0.55) 
-1.140249*** 
(-2.95) 
-.1803308 
(-0.52) 
.6754496*** 
(2.86) 
.5232556* 
(1.93) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
1 CGI 1
2 WTB .116
** 1
3 RTB .094
**
.077
* 1
4 WTD .025 .262
** .053 1
5 VTD .018 -.129
** -.030 .333
** 1
6 AOL/per capita GNI -.116
**
-.462
**
.091
** .056 .169
** 1
7 FTL .151
**
.137
** .040 -.060 -.030 -.133
** 1
8 HDI -.047 -.554
**
-.212
**
-.392
**
-.085
*
.133
**
.179
** 1
9 GDP/Capita -.019 -.350
**
-.220
**
-.319
** -.056 -.010 .244
**
.778
** 1
10 PAR 30 .000 .033 -.042 .057 .069
* -.030 .111
** -.044 -.019 1
11 Log year .041 .084
* .011 .326
**
.215
** -.049 .118
**
-.109
**
-.071
*
.145
** 1
12 Log assets .088
** -.057 .064 -.009 .202
** .011 -.026 -.100
**
-.099
** .038 .413
** 1
13 RS1 .045 -.177
** .038 .023 .162
**
.338
** -.021 -.083
* -.050 .027 -.082
*
.229
** 1
14 RS2 -.045 .177
** -.038 -.023 -.162
**
-.338
** .021 .083
* .050 -.027 .082
*
-.229
**
-1.000
** 1
15 LM1 -.141
**
-.332
**
-.068
* -.020 .194
**
.191
** -.053 .266
**
.217
**
.081
* .020 .062 .039 -.039 1
16 LM2 .051 .354
**
.089
** .022 -.065 -.337
**
.132
**
-.324
**
-.219
** -.016 -.034 -.117
**
-.224
**
.224
**
-.286
** 1
17 LM3 .073
* -.027 -.019 -.002 -.105
**
.128
**
-.068
* .055 .007 -.053 .012 .048 .158
**
-.158
**
-.582
**
-.612
** 1
18 LS1 .057 -.333
** -.006 .016 .360
**
.229
** -.032 .037 -.041 .043 .053 .412
**
.173
**
-.173
**
.195
**
-.078
*
-.094
** 1
19 LS2 .044 .024 .095
**
.251
**
.253
**
.091
** -.044 -.242
**
-.112
** .035 .078
*
-.101
**
.142
**
-.142
** -.008 -.018 .022 -.092
** 1
20 LS3 .018 -.067
* -.033 -.387
**
-.330
**
.152
**
-.081
*
.210
**
.132
** -.039 -.343
** -.066 .305
**
-.305
**
-.128
**
-.246
**
.314
**
-.353
**
-.235
** 1
21 LS4 -.052 .319
** .022 .226
**
-.104
**
-.373
**
.145
**
-.205
**
-.156
** .001 .272
**
-.128
**
-.488
**
.488
**
-.071
*
.349
**
-.237
**
-.247
**
-.165
**
-.631
** 1
22 LS5 -.070
* -.051 -.071
*
.127
**
.182
** .002 -.028 .172
**
.231
** -.016 .053 -.097
**
-.086
*
.086
*
.179
** -.043 -.111
**
-.076
* -.051 -.195
**
-.136
** 1
Correlation matrix (Social Performance)
GDP/capita 9.81e-06** 
(2.26) 
-.0000107 
(-1.64) 
-.0000103 
(-1.49) 
-3.14e-06 
(-0.50) 
-.0000169*** 
(-4.20) 
.0000126*** 
(2.62) 
PAR .0077074 
(0.58) 
-.0229895 
(-0.76) 
.0275932 
(0.97) 
.0005047 
(0.02) 
-.0090777 
(-0.78) 
.0139158 
(0.74) 
Log age .0578983* 
(1.74) 
-.040787 
(-0.66) 
.2065381*** 
(3.34) 
.1101864* 
(1.77) 
-.0066989 
(-0.23) 
.1076459** 
(2.58) 
Log assets .0058859 
(0.52) 
.0227843 
(1.01) 
-.0199301 
(-0.90) 
.0007607 
(0.03) 
-.008363 
(-0.84) 
.0053304 
(0.36) 
Regulated 
MFIs 
-.0745452* 
(-1.74) 
.0101672 
(0.18) 
.1071663* 
(1.74) 
.1113854** 
(2.09) 
.1113864*** 
(2.70) 
.0811113* 
(1.87) 
Individual 
lending 
-.0862812** 
(-2.05) 
.007557 
(0.14) 
-.0195406 
(-0.32) 
.0900036* 
(1.72) 
.0491073 
(1.21) 
-.0427269 
(-1.00) 
Group lending .0817765* 
(1.94) 
.0335828 
(0.60) 
-.1549557** 
(-2.56) 
-.0210622 
(-0.40) 
-.1071369*** 
(-2.64) 
.1156256*** 
(2.70) 
Banks -.2635213*** 
(-2.84) 
-.0098372 
(-0.08) 
-.4045323*** 
(-3.02) 
-.0257579 
(-0.22) 
.0873381 
(0.98) 
.0644437 
(0.68) 
Banks (rural) -.1455639 
(-1.38) 
.1171267 
(0.84) 
-.1591804 
(-1.05) 
-.0175485 
(-0.13) 
.0703162 
(0.69) 
.0933298 
(0.87) 
NBFIs -.0146176 
(-0.17) 
.0200027 
(0.18) 
-.5582575*** 
(-4.63) 
-.4951578*** 
(-4.72) 
-.0078087 
(-0.10) 
.0670253 
(0.79) 
NGOs .0095301 
(0.11) 
.0226998 
(0.20) 
-.2634626** 
(-2.15) 
-.4028607*** 
(-3.80) 
-.0970882 
(-1.18) 
.1725926** 
(1.99) 
Wald-Chi2 172.83*** 20.30* 131.41*** 133.32*** 91.33*** 69.64*** 
R Square 0.4913 0.0695 0.3561 0.3099 0.2895 0.1710 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level, ** Statistical significance at 5% level, * Statistical significance at 10% level 
Omitted variables are non-regulated MFIs, MFIs with individual and group lending, and credit unions 
 
